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DECIDED CASES
Decided January 22, 2007
Question Presented:
Whether a sentencing judge is allowed to consider
facts not determined by the jury or admitted by the defendant,
as allowed by the California Determinate Sentencing Law, or
whether this law is unconstitutional?
Facts:
John Cunningham was convicted of child sexual abuse
in the California state courts.  During his sentencing hearing,
the judge made an upward departure from the sentencing guide-
lines based on facts not determined by the jury to be true
beyond a reasonable doubt.  This decision was within the pow-
ers of the judge as defined by California’s Determinate
Sentencing Law.
The petitioner appealed the sentence citing Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations.  The state court of appeals
upheld the sentence and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to resolve the question of whether the California statute was
in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Decision:
Justice Ruth Bader-Ginsburg wrote the majority opin-
ion for this 6-3 decision.  The court held that California’s deter-
minate sentencing rule violated the petitioner’s constitutional
right to a jury trial by placing “sentence-elevating fact-finding”
within the province of the trial judge.  The Majority argued that
“[t]his court has repeatedly held that, under the Sixth
Amendment, any fact that exposes the defendant to a greater
potential sentence must be found by the jury, not a judge, and
established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.”  The judgment was reversed in part
and remanded.  Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito dissented.
Decided December 11, 2006
Question Presented:
Did the appearance of the deceased’s family in court
with photographic buttons of the deceased violate the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant in a murder trial in which the
defendant claimed self-defense?
Facts:
Petitioner Musladin appealed his conviction for first
degree murder, among other crimes, citing the trial court’s deci-
sion to deny his motion to prevent family members of the
deceased sitting in the courtroom from wearing buttons with the
likeness of the deceased imprinted on them.  Petitioner
Musladin argued that these buttons were inherently prejudicial
to the jury and deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair
trial.  The California Court of Appeals held that Musladin had
to show actual or inherent prejudice to succeed on his claim, cit-
ing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), and ruled that he
had not met this test.  
The Ninth Circuit overruled, holding that the decision of the
state court of appeals “was contrary to or involved an unreason-
able application of, clearly established federal law,” citing 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in Holbrook and Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
521 (1976).
Decision:
The Supreme Court held, in a 9-0 decision (Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter concurring), that because both
Estelle and Holbrook dealt with “state-sponsored courtroom
practices,” in contrast to the spectator conduct in this case, and
because of the dearth of decisions on the issue at bar, it could
not be said that the California Court of Appeals’ decision “was
contrary to” or “unreasonably applied” established federal law.
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, was wrong to reverse Musladin’s
conviction.  The ruling of the Ninth Circuit was vacated and
remanded.
Decided January 9, 2007
Questions Presented:
1. Is the holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004), a new rule or was it dictated by Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2006)?
2.  If Blakely is a new rule, does its requirement that the
facts resulting in an enhanced statutory maximum be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt apply retroactively?
Facts:
Petitioner Burton was convicted of raping a minor,
among other crimes, and was sentenced to forty-seven years in
prison.  The petitioner’s sentence was twenty-one years longer
that the maximum recommended under the sentencing guide-
lines.  The petitioner appealed his sentence in the Ninth Circuit,
arguing that Blakely v. Washington, which requires that evi-
dence used by the judge during sentencing be found by the jury
to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, should be applied retroac-
tively to his sentence.  Further, the petitioner argued that his
sentence violated the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey that factors
utilized by the judge to increase a sentence beyond the maxi-
mum term in the sentencing guidelines must be proved to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Ninth Circuit held that Blakely was a new rule that
could not be applied retroactively to the petitioner’s sentence
and that Apprendi did not apply because the sentence imposed
did not exceed the statutory maximum in the sentenc-
47 Criminal Law Brief
SUPREME COURT WATCH: RECENT DECISIONS AND UPCOMING CRIMINAL
CASES FOR THE 2006-2007 DOCKET
Andrew Myerberg*
Cunningham v. California
Carey v. Musladiin
Burton v. Waddington
ing guidelines.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Decision:
In a procedural ruling, the United States Supreme
Court held that petitioner Burton’s habeas petition was to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Because the court held that
the petitioner’s appeal was a “second or successive petition,”
the petitioner was required to obtain the proper authorization
before filing.  The petitioner failed to do so in this case.  The
Supreme Court in a 9-0 per curiam opinion dismissed the case
because of an invalid petition and declined to rule on the ques-
tions presented. 
Decided November 13, 2006
Questions Presented:
1. Is the “unadorned factor (k)” instruction constitution-
ally deficient under Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990),
because it would confuse a reasonable juror into thinking that
post-conviction behavior of the defendant could not be consid-
ered as a mitigating factor during sentencing?
2. If the instruction is found to be deficient, may that rul-
ing be applied retroactively? 
Facts:
Petitioner Belmontes was tried and convicted of first
degree murder in California state court and sentenced to death.
During his sentencing hearing the petitioner offered mitigating
evidence.  During the jury instruction, the judge gave the jury
the “unadorned factor (k)” instruction, informing the jury that
they may consider the mitigating evidence presented and “any
other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”  The jury
summarily sentenced the petitioner to death.
The California Supreme Court upheld the sentence,
rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the “unadorned factor
(k)” instruction’s ambiguity caused confusion in the jury about
whether they could evaluate post-conviction behavior as a mit-
igating circumstance.  The court held that under the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holding in Boyde v. California, the instruction
was constitutional unless the petitioner could show “reasonable
likelihood” of confusion.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit over-
turned the sentence holding that a reasonable juror could be
confused by the instruction.
Decision:
In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
California’s “unadorned factor (k)” instruction was constitu-
tional.  The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, rea-
soned that under Boyde, a reasonable juror would not be con-
fused by the instruction.  The court found that the instruction
was a sufficiently clear “catchall” under which the jury could
sufficiently evaluate mitigating evidence of both past and future
conduct.  Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion.
Decided February 21, 2007
Question Presented:
When does the statute of limitations for an 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claim for damages emanating from a false arrest begin
to toll? 
Facts:
In 1994, the petitioner was arrested for and charged
with murder.  He was convicted of the crime in 1996 and began
serving his sentence.  During his trial the petitioner asserted that
he has been coerced into confessing to the crime and that there
was no probable cause for his arrest.  In 1998, an appeals court
reversed his sentence and in 2002 all charges relating to the
murder were dropped.
The next year, the petitioner filed suit in federal dis-
trict court alleging that the false arrest performed by the police
was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  The district
court ruled that the petitioner could not bring the suit, stating
that, because of Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations, the case
was barred.  
The petitioner appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals arguing that the statute of limitations did not apply
until the charges against him were dropped.  The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court, noting a circuit
split, but holding that the statute of limitations began to toll at
the time of arrest. 
Decision:
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit
and held that the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim for damages resulting from a false arrest “begins to run at
the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal
process.”
UPCOMING CASES
Docket # 06-313
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
Did the Eighth Circuit exceed the scope of its authori-
ty under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 by overturning a state death penalty conviction by holding
that the inflammatory nature of the prosecutor’s closing argu-
ment during the penalty phase of the trial deprived the defen-
dant of Due Process of law?
Facts:
William Weaver was tried in Missouri state court for
the murder of a prospective witness during a drug trial.  He was
convicted of the crime and during the penalty phase of
Weaver’s trial, the prosecutor made closing arguments to the
jury perceived by the defendant to be inflammatory and preju-
dicial.  Weaver was convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death.  Weaver appealed his conviction in the
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Missouri state courts and was denied relief.  
District Court in the Eighth Circuit granted habeas
review.  The District Court held that the inflammatory nature of
the prosecutor’s closing argument deprived the defendant of a
fair trial and was a Due Process violation.  The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.  The state of Missouri appealed the
judgment to the United States Supreme Court.
Docket No. 05-1631
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
1. Does a police officer who ends a high speed chase by
crashing his car into that of the suspect violate the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures?
2.  Is it “clearly established” under federal law that a
police officer commits a Fourth Amendment violation when
that officer uses deadly force in a high-speed chase?
Facts:
During a high speed chase, Officer Timothy Scott
rammed his vehicle into that of a 19 year old fleeing speeder,
Victor Harris.  The impact caused Harris’ car to crash.  As a
result of the crash Harris was paralyzed from the neck down.
Harris filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, alleging that Scott violated his Fourth Amendment
rights against unreasonable seizure by using excessive force.
The District Court ruled for Harris, holding that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated.  
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment against Officer Scott, citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, for the proposition that deadly force could not be used
to perform a seizure unless the suspect’s actions presented a
“significant threat of death” to the public.  The court held that
speeding and traffic violations on mostly empty roads did not
meet that threshold.  
Docket # 05-1575
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
Can a conviction for attempted burglary qualify as a
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Facts:
The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) imposes a
mandatory fifteen (15) year sentence on defendants who are
arrested for possession of a firearm and have been previously
convicted of three “serious drug crimes” or “violent offenses.”
In 2003, Alphonso James, Jr. was arrested and tried in federal
district court in Florida for possession of a firearm.  On his
record, James had a previous conviction for attempted burglary
and two previous convictions for drug trafficking.  The govern-
ment moved for enhanced sentencing because the convictions
for trafficking and attempted burglary fell under the scope of
ACCA as “serious drug crimes” and “violent felonies.”
James objected, arguing that attempted burglary was
not a “violent felony” and that one of his drug trafficking con-
victions could not be classified as a “serious drug crime.”  The
district court ruled in favor of James, holding that because the
challenged drug trafficking conviction was not a “serious drug
crime,” James only had two convictions for the purposes of the
ACCA and, thus, the government could not move for enhanced
sentencing under the statute.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the
judgment of the district court.  The Eleventh Circuit held that
the challenged drug trafficking conviction was, in fact, a “seri-
ous drug crime.”  Further, the court agreed with the district
court that attempted burglary was a “violent crime” under
ACCA, resulting in a circuit split between the Eleventh and the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits.   Consequently, James was deemed to
qualify under the statute for enhanced punishment.  
Docket # 06-5618
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
1. Is a sentence below the minimum of the range within
the Federal Sentence Guidelines reasonable?
2. Is it permissible for the court to require that a sentence
that significantly departs from the Sentencing Guidelines be
justified by “extraordinary circumstances” in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Booker?
Facts:
Mario Claiborne was arrested and charged with two
felony drug crimes.  Claiborne was tried in United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and plead
guilty to both crimes.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines sug-
gested a sentencing range of thirty-seven to forty-six months for
the crimes in question.  However, during sentencing, the judge
used her discretion to impose a term of fifteen months (15) in
prison on Claiborne.  In making her decision, the judge stated
that the range set by the guidelines was merely a recommenda-
tion that did not bind her.  The judge cited the defendants youth,
lack of a criminal record, and the relatively small amount of
narcotics in question as circumstances influencing her decision.
The government appealed the sentencing decision to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the actual term
imposed was unreasonable.  The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a
sentence, such as that in this case, that was substantially outside
of the bounds of the Sentencing Guidelines had to be justified
by “extraordinary circumstances.”  Further, the court held that
such circumstances had not been put forward by the district
court judge.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a circuit split on these issues.
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